Synergy. Market expansion. Gaining share. Cost savings. Diversification. Talent acquisition. Owning a unique asset. Moving into a high-growth sector. These and many more reasons have often propelled companies into one another’s arms, regardless of the generally dismal track record such combinations reveal.
The Persistent Paradox of M&A Failure
Here's a puzzle that should keep every boardroom awake at night: Between 70% and 90% of mergers and acquisitions fail to deliver their promised value, yet in 2024 alone companies spent over $2.6 trillion annually chasing the merger mirage. This isn't just a statistic—it reveals the same kind of breakdowns in planning for big things that we also see in the systemic failures of mega projects and in my own work on major corporate innovations that went terribly, terribly, wrong, landing them in my “flops file.”
The big weakness? Taking untested assumptions as facts. Making a big decision all at once without the opportunity to course-correct. Taking too long to reach a result with the effect that the time for risks to emerge expands broadly. And often, leaders personally associated with the strategy that led to the decision, opening the window for all kinds of cognitive and social biases, including the famous “escalation of commitment to a failing course of action.”
The Latest Chapter: Dick's and Foot Locker Dance the Acquisition Tango
Consider an example unfolding before our eyes: Dick's Sporting Goods' $2.4 billion acquisition of Foot Locker, announced in May 2025. On paper, it reads like a strategy consultant's dream—two complementary retail giants combining forces to dominate the athletic footwear landscape. Dick's serves affluent, suburban, older customers with its “house of sports” strategy while Foot Locker targets urban, younger, lower-to-middle income sneaker enthusiasts. Foot Locker brings the prospect of international markets, greater leverage with manufacturers and access to the sneaker culture that once made Foot Locker iconic.
The executive rhetoric is predictably optimistic. Dick's CEO Lauren Hobart speaks of creating "a new global platform" serving "ever-evolving needs through iconic concepts consumers know and love.” Some observers are enthusiastic, gushing that “Dick’s is buying itself a passport to the world.” Others are not so sanguine. The market's immediate reaction tells a different story: while Foot Locker's shares surged 85%, Dick's stock fell 14%—a classic sign that investors see the deal as more beneficial to the acquired company than the acquirer.
More tellingly, analyst John Kernan from TD Cowen called the deal a "strategic mistake," arguing that Dick's will need to increase investments to scale and fix Foot Locker. This isn't just skepticism—it's pattern recognition from someone who's seen this movie before. Fortune’s Phil Wahba is even more negative – saying that “no matter how talented an executive is, the turnaround of a damaged brand is difficult, distracting and offers no guarantees.” The Fortune article concludes “Wall Street says don’t do it, Dick’s.”
The Integration Trap: Where Good Intentions Go to Die
What makes the Dick's-Foot Locker deal particularly illuminating is how it embodies a classic M&A failure pattern. Foot Locker operates about 2,400 stores across 20 countries but has closed hundreds of stores since 2023, struggling with the decline of mall-based retail. Their well-regarded CEO, Mary Dillon, was very successful in her previous role, putting Ulta Beauty at the top of its category, but she has struggled to right the ship at Foot Locker. Dick's isn't just buying a business—it’s inheriting a transformation challenge.
The standard explanation for failed M&A deals points to integration as the problem, but this is particularly severe when acquiring "complementary" businesses that the acquirer thinks they understand well. History suggests such assumptions can be quite dangerous. Dick's leadership believes it understands retail, but Foot Locker's business model, customer base, and cultural DNA are fundamentally different. As analyst David Swartz noted, "Foot Locker was designed as a mall-based retailer when malls were the dominant place that people went to shop... And that has changed. And part of the reason why that has changed is Dick's Sporting Goods".
This is the integration trap in action: confidence bred from superficial similarities masking deep operational and cultural differences. I sincerely hope it works out for them – if everything goes according to plan, it could refresh a flailing retailer and ignite new growth for a slowing franchise.
The Synergy Seduction: When 1 + 1 Equals Less Than 2
The language around mergers has become a masterclass in strategic wishful thinking. The usage frequency of "synergy" in corporate merger announcements tripled between the 2000s and 2010s. But synergies aren't mathematical certainties—they're bets on behavioral change across two (or more) complex organizational systems.
Research shows that 83% of merger deals failed to boost shareholder returns, often due to mismanagement of brands, risk, price, strategy, cultures, or management capacity. The Dick's-Foot Locker combination promises cost synergies and enhanced negotiating power with suppliers like Nike, but these benefits assume seamless integration of operations, systems, and cultures—assumptions that history suggests are rarely met.
Learning from the Wreckage: Recent Cautionary Tales
The landscape is littered with recent reminders of M&A hubris. Microsoft's acquisition of Nokia's mobile division for $7.2 billion in 2014 is considered one of the worst acquisitions of all time, resulting in massive layoffs and the failure to integrate Nokia's hardware with Microsoft's software ecosystem effectively.
The AOL-Time Warner merger of 2000, valued at $165 billion, promised transformation but delivered cultural integration disasters. More recently, the acquisition of Time Warner by AT&T failed despite seeming promising on paper, with AT&T struggling to merge distribution networks with content creation.
Even successful companies aren't immune. Google's acquisition of Motorola for $12.5 billion in 2011 failed to establish a significant foothold in hardware, leading to its sale to Lenovo for $2.9 billion just three years later.
The CEO Confidence Conundrum
Why do smart leaders keep making the same mistakes? The research points to overconfident CEOs and boards who, despite substantial evidence to the contrary, imagine that a transformational acquisition can pull a company's profitability and stock performance out of the doldrums.
This suggests that acquisitions appear in many cases to be tenure insurance for CEOs—a way to demonstrate bold action and vision, regardless of actual value creation. The pressure to show growth, combined with the seductive narrative of "strategic transformation," creates a powerful cognitive bias toward deal-making. It’s also worth remembering that CEO’s are often affected by their own power – the point of forgetting that success in one set of circumstances doesn’t guarantee it in another.
A Different Path Forward: The Uncertainty-Informed Approach
The persistent failure rate of M&A suggests we need a fundamentally different approach—one that embraces rather than denies uncertainty. Instead of betting on synergy projections, leaders should:
Start with optionality over integration. Rather than immediate full integration, structure deals to preserve the ability to learn and adapt. The most successful acquisitions often maintain separate operations initially, allowing for gradual integration based on actual rather than projected synergies.
Price for probable failure. If 70-90% of deals fail, pricing should reflect this reality. Pay prices that make sense even if synergies don't materialize, rather than justifying premiums based on overly optimistic scenarios.
Focus on capability acquisition, not market consolidation. The most successful recent tech acquisitions—think Google's purchase of YouTube or Facebook's acquisition of Instagram—focused on acquiring unique capabilities and allowing them to flourish within a larger ecosystem.
Build integration competence before you need it. Companies like Cisco have completed over 200 acquisitions successfully, crediting much of their success to recognizing that human capital is crucial and maintaining 87% retention of key employees from acquired companies for more than two years.
The Bottom Line
Mergers don’t fail because the leaders are incompetent, but because they're operating under the illusion that complex organizational change can be engineered through financial engineering. The real question isn't whether the Dick’s-Foot Locker deal will succeed—the odds say it won't. The question is when leaders will stop being seduced by the merger mirage and start building the patient, incremental capabilities that create lasting competitive advantage.
Incentives matter too, of course. CEO pay is highly correlated with company size. And sometimes mergers are prompted by a desire to keep a competitor from making a similar move. But in a world of genuine uncertainty, the most strategic move might be to resist the siren call of transformational deals altogether. Sometimes the boldest strategy is the one that doesn't make headlines.
It indeed seems like a strategic mistake.
DKS had a clear business model, but now it’s introduced another dependent on a weak mall segment. Plus DKS probably would’ve taken share from FL over time anyway, so why pay a premium for it?
DKS, with no sales outside the US, also has no expertise managing an expansive international retail network.
Generally spells trouble.
One word: ego.